States face an increasing number of challenges, such as traditional, irregular, and terrorist threats. The dilemma will not be anymore whether the state will face a conventional or irregular enemy, rather how to deal with the two of them at the same time.

Lorenzo Cominotto

The the term hybrid war has become infamous following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It describes a concept of war different from the conventional idea of open confrontation between two or more states whose forces are well-defined and operate through conventional tactics.[1]
We do not have a single, clear definition of hybrid warfare; nevertheless, the work of Frank Hoffman is one of the most prominent. He defines hybrid wars as an incorporation of different methods of warfare – conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal – performed by both states and non-state actors. The goal is to achieve a synergic effect both physical and psychological.[2]
Many wars have had both regular and irregular components; however, in most conflicts these efforts are spread in different theaters or formations, while hybrid wars concert them in a single action.
Conventional, irregular, and terrorist attacks are not distinct, all are present to blur the idea of what kind of war is being fought, who is fighting, and what technologies are being used. Opponents will avoid predictability and will seek advantage in unexpected ways and ruthless modes.
While hybrid warfare does not mean the end of conventional warfare, it does present a complicating factor for strategic planning and will require intellectual and institutional adaptation, since it cannot be countered simply by mere overwhelming military power.
According to Hoffman, Western states have been reluctant and slow in addressing these new characteristics of modern wars, causing structural and investment delays.
Hybrid tactics converge multiple warfare types into a mutant form that challenges easy categorization in classic definitions. For example, non-state actors can take part in conventional conflicts, exploiting access to state-like capabilities and organization. At the same time, states may as well merge irregular and conventional warfare, blending high-tech capabilities with terrorism and cyber-warfare to blur distinction and avoid consequences. Hybridity also consider nontypical means, such as criminality, to cause added troubles to the target, to wear down resistance or to actually defeat conventional opponents.[3]

Evolution of the concept

Several schools of thought have provided the base for the concept of hybrid warfare.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)

It aims to blur the nature of the conflict, especially regarding the difference between war and peace and between combatants and noncombatants.
The point is to weaken the state system through non state actors that can then challenge its legitimacy.[4]
Nevertheless, this concept has ignored the fact that several conflicts, such as the Crusades, Europe’s reformation period and Britain’s imperial history, contain elements of what it considers fourth generation warfare.
Despite this, the idea of achieving political cohesion indirectly rather than via fielded military forces has merits.

Compound Wars

Compound wars are characterized by a significant degree of coordination between regular and irregular forces.[5] The result is the exploitation of the advantages of each force. For example, irregular forces can be used to disperse the opponent’s resources and while conventional ones can be employed when major power is needed.
During the French invasion of Spain, for example, Napoleon’s forces had to fight British regulars and Spanish guerrilla at the same time.[6]
Thomas Edward Lawrence’s irregular forces were strategically directed and supplied by the British in their fight against the Ottoman Empire during the Arab Revolt.[7]
Finally, during the Vietnam war, Viet Cong’s irregular tactics were combined with the North Vietnamese Army’s more conventional capabilities[8].
Nevertheless, several critics pointed out that the concept does not hold up to its own definition since only cases of partial strategic coordination, rather than forces fighting alongside each other, has been identified.

Unrestricted Warfare

Chinese Colonels Qiao and Wang described the concept of Unrestricted warfare (or War Beyond Limits), which refers to the idea of war beyond its traditional military domain, driven by the implications of globalization.[9]
For them, technology drive politics, economics, military ideas, culture, diplomacy, and religion to merge and overlap with each others, benefitting from all their various advantages. This concept includes also the realms of information warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare, and other entirely new forms of war.

Historic example

We can cite several examples of what is now considered hybrid warfare.
In the nineteenth-century, the British managed to defeat the Spanish in Argentina, conquering Buenos Aires. The sense of triumph in the English newspapers and boost in the financial market was short-lived since the Spanish, fueling popular insurgencies and exploiting the architecture of the city, managed to recapture it.[10]
This battle therefore witnessed a mix of regular and irregular tactics and exploitation of clans and illicit networks. Also, the political side of the conflict was itself complex since it had both local and global consequences, with effects on the financial markets and a role played by the media.
The Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 saw hybrid elements as well, especially regarding the role of the media. The Boer leaders indeed hoped to weaponize the media to shake Britain’s domestic opinion, bringing attention on the harsh living condition of Boer civilians and in British concentration camps.[11]
In 1903, Russia established its presence in Korea, after gaining a concession to cut timber from the weak (almost failed) Korean government.
The Tsar’s forces used false narratives (such as disguising themselves as woodcutters armed for mere self-defence) and implemented diplomatic campaigns to confuse and delay negotiation, gaining time to organize forces then used in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905[12].
The Soviet Afghan war and the Russian War in Chechnya were characterized by high level of asymmetry between the parts. The Afghans used the monotonous landscape and high-tech portable anti-air systems supplied by the US to disrupt the Soviet advantage. Similarly, the Chechens used intensive urban tactics in Grozny while also beating Russia on the information and narrative in global media.
Finally, Moscow’s use of forces without distinctive markings on their uniforms – the infamous “little green men,” over whom the Kremlin denied having control – to seize administrative buildings and strategic facilities in Crimea can also be regarded as hybrid warfare.

Hybrid warfare in the Invasion of Ukraine

With the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s conventional operations have been supported by hybrid actions and amplified by nuclear threats, following General Gerasimov’s “active defence” doctrine.[13]
Since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s hybrid warfare has especially leveraged five components:

• Diplomatic warfare, to break existing state-to-state agreements, alliances, and international support.
• Information warfare, to influence the population and the international community through disinformation.
• Unattributed use of military power.
• Economic warfare, such as blackmail, sanctions, and leveraging of inflation.
• Cyber warfare to gain information and disrupt organization. For example, the 2022 attack was preceded by cyber operations focused on the Ukrainian governmental administration and financial systems, to delay the mobilisation of [14]

The Russian intervention has also exploited and amplified energy, humanitarian, and food crisis, respectively through striking critical energy infrastructure, forcing million of Ukrainians to become refugees,[15] and triggering a global food crisis.
Nevertheless, the Russian use of hybrid tactics has had drawbacks due to the fact that the mix of army forces, insurgents, paramilitary troops of the Wagner Group, Chechen irregulars, and foreign mercenaries did not help supporting the morale and the homogeneity of Russian fighting units.[16] Additionally, powerful irregular forces can themselves become a threat to a state’s strategy or even its survival, as briefly demonstrated by the Wagner Group’s mutiny in June 2023.

Conclusion

Hybrid warfare, as demonstrated by historical examples and by the war in Ukraine, has to be taken into account in modern strategic planning. The mix of conventional, irregular, cyber, and information tactics has blurred the traditional distinctions between peace and war, combatants and non-combatants, state and non-state actors.
The case of Ukraine highlights both the potential and the limitations of hybrid warfare. Russia’s multi-faceted approach has underlined the strategic significance of hybrid operations in modern international relations. Yet, as the conflict revealed, hybrid tactics can also expose vulnerabilities, such as logistical challenges, morale issues, and the risks posed by reliance on irregular forces. Hybrid warfare is not a brand-new concept, rather it is an evolution that requires rethinking traditional concepts to keep the pace with the ever-changing nature of warfare.

Note

[1] M. VAN CREVELD, «Modern conventional warfare: An overview», NIC Project 2020, May 25, 2004, https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/MODERM%20CONVENTIONAL%20WARFARE%20AN%20OVERVIEW%20%20BY%20MARTIN%20VAN%20CREVELD%20HEBREW%20UNIVERSITY%20JERUSALEM.pdf.
[2] F. HOFFMAN, «Conflict in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars», Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007; D. BETZ, «The Idea of Hybridity» in Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626377622-toc.
[3] D. BETZ, «The Idea of Hybridity», loc. cit.
[4] W. S. LIND, K. NIGHTENGALE, J. SCHMITT, G. I. WILSON, «The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation», Marine Corps Gazette, November 2001.
[5] T. HUBER, Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot>>, Command and General Staff College, 1996.
[6] C. J. ESDAILE, «Fighting Napoleon, Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808-1814», New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, pp. 154-155.
[7] B. H. LIDDELL HART, «Lawrence of Arabia», New York, Da Capo Press, 1989.
[8] H. G. MOORE, J. L. GALLOWAY, «We Were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam», New York, Random House, 1992.
[9]  Q. LIANG, W. XIANGSUI, «Unrestricted Warfare», Beijing, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.
[10] I. HERNON, «The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the Nineteenth Century», Sutton, 2000.
[11] D. BETZ, «The Idea of Hybridity», loc. cit.
[12] D. BETZ, «The Idea of Hybridity», loc. cit.
[13] D. JOHNSON, «General Gerasimov on the vectors of the development of military strategy», NATO Defence College, 2 March, 2019
[14] A. JACUCH, «The blurred lines of peace and war – An analysis of information operations used by the Russian Federation in CEE», The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16 November 2022; J.A. LEWIS, «Cyber war and Ukraine», CSIS, 16 June 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine.
[15] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2023, Emergency handbook. Operational Data Portal.
[16] C. C. IONITA, «Conventional and hybrid actions in the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine», Centre for Defence and Security Studies at National Defence University “Carol I”, 2023.

Photo: Hybrid Warfare