What does it say about the war at large?
By Shary Mitidieri
Introduction
In 1999, the movie Magnolia drew critical appraise from critics: the individual – and apparently inconsequential – decisions of the choral cast’s members tied the characters closer and closer together, leading to a decidedly paroxysmal ending. It is clear that, in reality, the pieces rarely fall perfectly into place as when they are guided by the hand of a screenwriter. However, events of limited scope can have wider resonance, given the right conditions and careful planning.
At a closer look, the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk, which started on August 6th, 2024, seems to be one of those cases where ends, ways and means align, favored by a series of calculated decisions whose consequences converge to produce results on a larger scale. The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Russian territory has had effects on many domains. Militarily, it represents an interesting development that allowed to raise the morale of the Ukrainian forces and to restore international partners’ confidence in the ability of Kyiv to defend itself (and to counter-attack, of course). From the political-diplomatic standpoint, it could help improve Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis a potential peace accord – despite the fact that the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, has recently ruled out the possibility of negotiations.[1] Additionally, it allowed a new narrative of resistance to be sewn onto Kyiv, after months of uncertainty about the continuation of Western support and widespread fatigue among the public opinion, both in Ukraine and in the Euro-Atlantic area at large.
Considering these developments and their implications, this article seizes the opportunity to reflect on the significance of the operation and some of its possible meanings for the conflict as a whole, without the ambition to be an exhaustive account of what is happening on the ground – all the more so as the situation changes very quickly, making it difficult to carry out in-depth analyses.
The military significance of the offensive: lessons learned and matters of principle
From a purely quantitative point of view, the fact that Ukraine controls a territory the size of New York City is not quite extraordinary, considering that Russia occupies 11% of the Easth’s landmass. Yet, the impact of the Kursk offensive is better represented in qualitative terms: the fact itself that the Ukrainian armed forces could seize and control any part of the Russian territory is a novelty in the context of the conflict and deserves further attention.
An important change is not only to have caught the opponent by surprise but the partners too. It would not seem that the operation had been previously agreed upon with NATO.[2] Furthermore, less than three weeks before the raid began, Jack Watling, senior researcher at the Royal United Services Institute, had concluded that “for Ukraine, the lead times involved in regenerating offensive combat power mean that renewed offensive operations are not viable in the foreseeable future.”[3]
To achieve this result, the Ukrainian forces had to overcome several critical points that Watling himself pointed out in relation to the 2023 Ukrainian offensive. At the time, not only had Kyiv been incapable of capitalizing off of the surprise effect, but also encountered serious difficulties in recruiting, training, and employing high-quality personnel. In this case, instead, it seems that the forces deployed at Kursk were better prepared and benefited from the training received from NATO countries and from a capacity for learning and adaptation that perhaps only a war for survival can inspire.[4] The inadequate planning that hindered the tempo of Ukraine’s offensive was replaced by more agile maneuvering. Sure, some structural issues remained – such as the chronic lack of ammo and personnel – but the Kursk operation largely circumvented them.
For their part, the Russian armed forces have struggled to maintain and demonstrate control and speed of reaction. The very fact that it was possible for Ukraine to conduct an incursion in Russian territory should raise an eyebrow to the state of Moscow’s military intelligence. In addition, the military personnel responsible for responding effectively to the raid was poorly trained,[5] leading to numerous desertions and reported cases of Russian soldiers looting their compatriots’ homes.[6]
Reading between the lines, the message for Kyiv’s supporters is that Russia’s armed forces, while capable of fighting a large-scale, long-lasting war, are in fact unable to fulfill their fundamental task: that is, to protect the national borders.
To be sure, Kyiv’s offensive has its own shortcomings: first of all, from the military standpoint, attacking Moscow’s airfields is more advantageous[7] and so far has effectively reduced the Russian air forces’ pressure on the Ukrainian defenses along the contact line. Furthermore, the Russian Federation has enough personnel and equipment to maintain its foothold in Ukraine while facing off the incursion, whereas Kyiv might struggle to maintain the occupied territory for a significant amount of time or even until negotiations start. Finally, such an intense campaign usually demands a heavy cost in terms of equipment, potentially limiting future offensive capabilities.
Yet, before diminishing the military significance of the offensive, it should be remembered that territorial integrity is a necessary condition of full statehood – together with the people and the monopoly on the use of force. In this phase, Kyiv has calculated that boosting the morale of its armed forces and rekindling international support were more immediate needs than preserving its strength for an unspecified later time. At any rate, as the following paragraph will show, the objectives and effects of the raid were more political-diplomatic than military.
Political and diplomatic implications of the raid for Kyiv
From Ukraine’s perspective and limited to the area of operations around Kursk, we could say that the political-diplomatic and the military domain positively influenced each other. Watling noted how, “politically, the purpose of the operation is to build leverage ahead of possible negotiations.”[8] As foreseen, the success of the first two weeks of the campaign have had two types of implication: from the diplomatic standpoint, it did improve Kyiv’s chances of negotiating a more acceptable and sustainable peace treaty. From the more strictly political point of view, instead, it turned the spotlight on the credibility of the Ukrainian defense for an audience of (understandably) fatigued partners, weary of a “special operation” turned war of attrition.
With respect to the future of negotiations, Kyiv’s government had already received assurances on NATO’s commitment to support the war effort “on a long-term” basis at the recent Washington Summit.[9] Despite this, it must have reckoned that the lack of “a clear, unequivocal commitment to help Ukraine sufficiently to compel the withdrawal of Russian forces to positions behind 1991 borders”[10] and to establish a clear path to NATO membership was not, in fact, a sufficient guarantee.
The upcoming presidential elections in the United States are an additional factor in determining the timing of the Kursk operation. At this time, Ukraine must not only worry about ways to push the Russian Federation into being more accommodating; how much – and how long – her friends are willing to bet or sacrifice to allow her to do so is also a serious concern. Should Donald Trump win the elections, it is possible that Kyiv would find itself under some serious pressure to enter negotiations.[11]
It should now be clearer that – and here we dive into the more political aspect of the matter – that the Kursk raid is instrumental to bringing back all eyes on Ukraine. Mediatic attention is all but essential to Ukraine, and not only because it needs to improve its negotiating position. The core of the issue is that, in order to achieve that objective, Ukraine has to entice its own allies.
Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, clarified this point in a recent interview:[12] “Experience teaches us that Russia only negotiates in good faith when it is placed under pressure, and negotiation is the only option. And we also have learned from our own history that facilitators want to end the war rather at the expense of Ukraine, which is also often true for cases of war in other parts of the world.”
Weapons, equipment, training, and diplomatic support come at an economic as well as a political cost. Over the past few months, Ukraine’s donors have grown acutely aware of this fact.[13] To Kyiv, this has meant turning the conflict into a performance that would bare its teeth toward the enemy, while also convincing partners that their investment has potential for good return. Thanks to the latest reconfiguration of the balance of forces on the ground, the discussions over Ukraine’s “concessions” to Russia have reached a halt.[14]
From Moscow’s perspective, as mentioned above, the incursion has remarked some of the shortcomings of the Russian defense, allowing Kyiv as well as other interested observers to answer some pressing questions over the effectiveness of the Federation’s border defense and the responsiveness and flexibility of its forces. Yet, Kursk also demands that we ask new questions, such as “what kind of weapons systems would Russia be willing to use to confront a (real or perceived) grave and immediate threat?”. To understand the relation between Kursk and Russia’s feelings of (in)security, the next paragraph will delve into the narration of the campaign.
Triumph and humiliation: the communication over Kursk
Beyond the more “tangible” political and military effects, the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk is also playing out on the field of perceptions. And perceptions are all the more important the more a country’s country’s chances of survival rely on the benevolence of international donors with lots of good intentions but a limited attention span.
Kyiv seems well aware that is competing for attention and resources with other crises and scenarios, from the Middle East to the (oddly quiet) Pacific. As a matter of fact, Ukrainian and international media jumped at the chance to describe the operation as an event of great consequence, a successful bet, and even extraordinary. In terms of institutional communication, this essentially positive language allows to justify to the public, in retrospect but also in view of future commitments, the provision of substantial military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
If, on the one hand, the public discourse over Kursk praises Ukraine’s accomplishments, on the other it slanders Russia’s reaction. The question is, thus, whether the narrative of Russia’s demise is truly advantageous. A recent (and otherwise brilliant) article by Brian Whitmore, appeared on The Atlanticist,[15] opens with a bold lexical choice, as the title indicates Kursk as the third great “humiliation” suffered by Vladimir Putin. The article points out – correctly – that, although militarily worn out, the Kremlin is bleeding much more copiously from the wounds inflicted on its media image (its narrative, if you want to say so) and on its international position more generally. In a few words, in the eyes of the (western) world, Russia has become “small”.
Undoubtedly, the violation of its borders was a blow to the credibility of the Russian defense, and by extension, of the Kremlin. It is also likely that this crisis might be the harbinger of heightened internal instability, as it is often the case when the “godfather” of a patronage network shows signs of weakness. And for sure, there is a certain subtle but satisfying irony in watching the invader be invaded, and plead for help to that same international community it gaslit with talks of “special operations” and “protecting the Russian people”.
However, this feeling of humiliation will not be inconsequential. First, as a reaction to the incursion, Putin and Medvedev denied negotiations were on the horizon, because “there could be no question of negotiations with an enemy he accused of targeting civilians in its operation in the Kursk region.”[16] For the moment, it is impossible to assess how much this constitutes a new posture and how much it is an empty threat. Notwithstanding this, Russia remains more willing and capable than Ukrain when it comes to sustaining a further extension or exasperation of the conflict.
Second – and while acknowledging that comments in this sense are still whispered at half-mouth – the Russian Federation always has the option of recurring to a tactical nuclear escalation should it feel cornered. At this time, the fact that Ukraine’s armed forces have boots on Russian ground acts limits Moscow’s options. The use of nuclear weapons on a country’s own territory is all but unthinkable. Yet, the assets of Western deterrence, especially in Europe and in the Mediterranean, may come to be considered a legitimate target. This could be concerning, especially as the Biden administration signaled that Russia, China, and North Korea may be coordinating on their nuclear strategy.[17]
What we do know is that instances of is that there have been reports of the use of thermobaric weapons within the Kursk area.[18] In this respect, it should be noted that the use of this type of weapons, classified as a flame throwers or heavy flame throwers, is considered at the very limit of international lawfulness,[19] as per the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons delle Nazioni Unite, signed by both Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
To sum up, an isolated, humiliated and crushed Russia could still amount to a formidable opponent – particularly if it calculated that the situation on the ground might benefit from a little “acceleration”.[20] It is probably bad enough that we are discussing the eventuality of decoupling as a reality. Like it or not, we cannot so easily exile Russia in Asia.
Conclusion
The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Kursk has been described here as an example of tactical action which may bear strategic implications. In these first two weeks of fighting on Russian territory, the operation has had a number of effects and consequences not only on the relative power of the combatants, but also on the future of negotiations that will affect Russia, Ukraine, and their respective line-ups or partner and allies. For now, the success of the operation has reignited Ukrainian hopes for a reasonably costly peace agreement, and applied pressure on Kyiv’s partner not to interrupt the flow of international aid at a time when it is so efficiently used.
Under this lens, Kursk is almost reminiscent of the August 1995 operation Storm, which allowed the Bosnian and Croatian forces to liberate many Serb-occupied territories in eastern Croatia and western Bosnia, thus gaining better leverage for peace negotiations. Sure, in that case NATO pushed its hand through operation Deliberate Force, finally convincing the bickery Balkan spouses to take part in the uneasy but somewhat effective Love Island format that Dayton came to be. This time, the allies will stand on the sidelines and, with the exception of conspiracy theorists, nobody really thinks that NATO is just about to intervene in forces. After all, Russia is not a rump, exhausted Yugoslavia.
On this note, it is probably useful to raise one final point. Some journalists and political analysts spared no effort to describe the Russian Federation as a system already precarious and now close to collapse, chaotic and clientelistic, lacking popular support and therefore unable to function. What they systematically fail to mention is that no such government could last three decades and, in the meantime, bear the political, economic and human cost of a three-year large-scale conflict with no end in sight. On the opposite end of the spectrum, self-styled guardians of the regime in Moscow unrelentlessly continue to paint its leader as a strategic masterming who always ends up landing on his feet.
At this stage of the conflict, one would hope such black and white analyses could be overcome. Accepting complexity means being able to ask the right questions, for example: while we have a generic idea of what Putin wants in Ukraine, what does he want in Russia? The “special operation” started with the – primarily political – objective to restore Moscow’s area of influence. Now that the vision of a submitted, complaisant Ukraine (or Belarus, for that matter) has been shattered, and that the very public security in Russia is threatened, what new objective or justification will the Kremlin to come up with to ensure the regime’s survival?
Note
[1] Reuters, Russia’s Medvedev says there will be no talks with Ukraine after Kursk incursion, 21/08/2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-says-there-will-be-no-talks-with-ukraine-after-kursk-incursion-2024-08-21/
[2] R. Rommen, Ukraine’s Kursk counteroffensive defied NATO predictions and shows Kyiv has its eye on the US election, experts say, Business Insider, 18/08/2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-incursion-offensive-kursk-russia-nato-officials-predictions-2024-8
[3] J. Watling, O. V. Danylyuk, N. Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23, RUSI Special Report, 18/07/2024, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-ukraines-offensive-operations-2022-23
[4] G. Mills, A. Prat Gay, J.C. Pinzon and Dr K. von Hippel, Decoding Kursk: Is the End in Sight in Ukraine?, Royal United Services Institute, 21/08/2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/decoding-kursk-end-sight-ukraine
[5] PBS News, The Kursk attack could test the patience of some of Putin’s backers in Russia, 21/08/2024, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-kursk-attack-could-test-the-patience-of-some-of-putins-backers-in-russia
[6] M. Weiss, J. Rushton, How Ukraine Caught Putin’s Forces Off Guard in Kursk — And Why, New Lines Magazine, 14/08/2024, https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/how-ukraine-caught-putins-forces-off-guard-in-kursk-and-why/
[7] J. Watling, Ukraine’s extraordinary incursion into Kursk has changed the narrative of the war – but is a high-risk strategy, The Guardian, Analysis, 17/08/2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/17/ukraine-offensive-russia-political-logic-but-high-risk-strategy
[8] J. Watling, Ukraine’s extraordinary incursion into Kursk has changed the narrative of the war – but is a high-risk strategy, The Guardian, Analysis, 17/08/2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/17/ukraine-offensive-russia-political-logic-but-high-risk-strategy
[9] NATO, Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 10/07/2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm
[10] S. Smith, NATO leaders advance Ukraine’s cause at Washington summit, Chatham House, Expert Comment, 12/07/2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/07/nato-leaders-advance-ukraines-cause-washington-summit
[11] R. Menon, A Trump presidency would leave Ukraine to its fate – because he has China in his sights, The Guardian, 25/07/2024, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jul/25/ukraine-war-russia-us-trump-election
[12] G. Mills, A. Prat Gay, J.C. Pinzon and Dr K. von Hippel, Decoding Kursk: Is the End in Sight in Ukraine?, Royal United Services Institute, 21/08/2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/decoding-kursk-end-sight-ukraine
[13] M. Wolf, ‘Ukraine fatigue’ is unpardonable, Financial Times, 30/01/2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ca7fa865-97a1-4013-bde6-b69731b03232
[14] O. Tokariuk, Ukraine’s gamble in Kursk restores belief it can beat Russia – it requires a Western response, Chatham House, Expert Comment, 19/08/2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/08/ukraines-gamble-kursk-restores-belief-it-can-beat-russia-it-requires-western-response
[15] B. Whitmore, Ukraine’s Kursk offensive marks Putin’s third major humiliation of the war, The Atlanticist, 15/08/2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraines-kursk-offensive-marks-putins-third-major-humiliation-of-the-war/
[16] Reuters, Putin says Ukraine wants to destabilise Russia with Kursk offensive, 12/08/2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-ukraine-trying-destabilise-russia-with-kursk-offensive-2024-08-12/
[17] D.E. Sanger, Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat, The New York Times, 20/08/2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-russia.html?emc=edit_na_20240820&ref=cta&nl=breaking-news
[18] G. Barbati, Ucraina, Sesto giorno di offensiva in Russia: usata bomba termobarica per fermare avanzata a Kursk, Euronews, 11/08/2024. In: https://it.euronews.com/2024/08/11/ucraina-sesto-giorno-di-offensiva-in-russia-usata-bomba-termobarica-per-fermare-avanzata-a
[19] A. Minervini, Cosa sono le armi termobariche?, Opinio Juris, 12/08/2024, https://www.opiniojuris.it/russia-russia-csi/cosa-sono-le-armi-termobariche/
[20] S. Ramani, Russia will use nukes regardless of whether we arm Ukraine, The Telegraph, 18/06/2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/06/18/russia-will-use-nukes-regardless-of-whether-the-west-arms-u/
File photo:A crossing point on the border with Russia a is seen, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, near the Russian border in Sumy region, Ukraine August 11, 2024. REUTERS/Viacheslav Ratynskyi