Nine years after the outbreak of the conflict, Washington finds itself navigating the Middle Eastern front, a crucial test for its leadership.
The context
Emerging in the early 1990s, the Houthi movement stems from a minority branch of Shiite Islam. Specifically, it comprises followers of the Zaidi doctrine and positions itself within a broader anti-Western and anti-Israeli stance.[1] Already since the end of the last century, the Houthis have distinguished themselves through their rebellion against the regime of Ali Abdallah Saleh, opposing a unified republic under Sunni dominance. In 2011, leveraging the momentum of the Arab Spring, they spearheaded the popular uprising, leading to guerrillas and uprisings against the incumbent president. Four years later, the Houthis managed to seize power, provoking the ire of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which, in light of its interests in the region, called for the restoration of the regime recognized by the international community. It was precisely from this juncture that the scenario of a civil war materialized. On one side, the Houthi rebels, backed by Iran for political and religious reasons, and on the other, an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia.[2] The result has been significant internal devastation in terms of death and famine, coupled with regional instability that, especially following the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, has undermined Riyadh’s interests. In fact, Houthi missile attacks and acts of sabotage in Yemen have repeatedly threatened Saudi oil production and exports. Other repercussions of the conflict can be traced in the increased costs that Riyadh has had to bear. On one hand, significant expenses are incurred to acquire new weapons (from the American ally);[3] on the other hand, Saudi Arabia has had to increase its investments to ensure the security of its oil infrastructure. This has entailed additional costs for monitoring, protection, and defence of the oil facilities, thus influencing the country’s budgets and financial policies. Saudi involvement stems from the kingdom’s longstanding attention to the Yemeni state. Various factors contribute to this attention. Firstly, the geopolitical location, as the border with Saudi Arabia extends for over a thousand miles. Secondly, Yemen also shares borders with the entrance to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which is a crucial hub for crude oil export routes. What is at stake for the kingdom (and beyond) is the control of maritime trade passing through the Persian Gulf, constituting approximately 8% of global oil supplies.[4] It is primarily for these reasons that the United States, in coalition with a broader Western alliance, has directly intervened against the Houthi rebels. Over the course of these conflict-ridden years, the Houthis have notably carried out missile attacks on commercial ships, which could have long-term repercussions on international trade.[5] Furthermore, Washington’s interests intersect unavoidably on one hand with its support for Israel, given the challenging regional dynamics it faces with neighbouring countries, and on the other hand, particularly with the intent to undermine a adversary like Tehran. In the Middle East, for ancient times, a competition for geopolitical dominance in the region has unfolded. Iran and Saudi Arabia emerge as two central nodes of power and influence, deeply opposed to each other. On one side, a country that, from the Khomeini revolution to the present day, identifies the United States as the symbol of evil and something that must be fought against to prevent the contamination of Shiite customs and practices. On the other side, a monarchy that, despite safeguarding the sacred sites of Islam, has long opened itself to a partnership for commercial and regional security reasons.
Washington’s involvement
Saudi Arabia is the largest arms importer in the entire Persian Gulf. Historically, among the major sellers are Western allies, namely the United Kingdom and the United States. In 2021, the U.S. expressed its stance on this matter through the spokesperson of the State Department. Specifically, the statements concerned the surface-to-air missiles supplied to Riyadh in perfect alignment with «the administration’s commitment to ending the conflict in Yemen».[6] However, things have unfolded differently, as to date in 2024, the conflict has not concluded but has rather experienced an escalation with even more direct involvement from Washington. Since January 12, the United States and the United Kingdom have carried out multiple joint operations against the Houthi rebels. According to the statements of the Pentagon chief, Lloyd Austin, «they will pay the consequences if they do not cease their illegal attacks, damaging the economies of the Middle East, causing environmental harm, and disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen and other countries».[7] It is precisely here that the United States has much to lose, as they are called to defend their hegemony primarily against Iran. According to Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, «it has been since 1973 that we haven’t seen the situation worsen in this way».[8]
American raids in Yemen are not a recent development. In fact, according to a report from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. has conducted nearly 400 raids in Yemen since 2002.[9] In a statement, the White House reported that «the attacks are in response to raids against ships in the Red Sea» and that «America will not hesitate to strike again». The reasons are always rooted in the numerous commercial interests that every superpower, including the United States, possesses in a specific area, which in this case corresponds to the Persian Gulf.
A direct consequence of Washington’s maritime supremacy that it must defend. Indeed, while Clausewitz teaches that the reason for engaging in bloody wars is primarily to break the will of the opponent, it is equally true that in a world governed by superpowers, it is appropriate to believe that they support one faction or another almost exclusively due to commercial interests and the regional influence to be exerted. Notably, due to the Houthi attacks aimed at obstructing access to the Red Sea, many have effectively severed ties between Europe and Asia. Primary examples include the Danish trade giant Maersk and the German behemoth Hapag-Lloyd.[10] Additional reasons for the American involvement in support of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthi rebels can be traced to two fundamental aspects: hydrocarbons and security. Regarding the former, during the years of the war, especially in the areas near the border, the Kingdom’s oil and energy infrastructure has been targeted by the rebel faction. According to the Energy Security Sentinel report, the attacks constitute the primary cause of the nearly one hundred incidents recorded in Saudi oil infrastructure. In this regard, it is known that what has bound the United States and Saudi Arabia is an unwritten pact summed up in security (with an anti-Iranian perspective) in exchange for oil. As for the second aspect, Washington fears that the ongoing conflict and the potentially increasing anti-American sentiment, fuelled in part by Iranian support, may lead to the growth of extremist and terrorist groups in the region. A region in which the White House aims to conduct business, but where these aspirations clash with words like insecurity, instability, war, and destruction.
The reactions of the international community
From the UN podium, the Iranian delegate strongly reiterated that the ongoing conflict is «an illegal and unjustified war that violates Yemen’s sovereignty, international laws, the United Nations Charter, and Security Council resolutions, endangering the peace and security of the region».[11] Russia, on the other hand, speaks of a «blatant aggression that has nothing to do with self-defence». Self-defence, on the other hand, has been invoked through Article 51 of the UN Charter by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and by NATO, as stated by spokesperson Dylan White. According to him, the attacks by destroyer ships should be interpreted in a defensive light to preserve the viability of commerce in the Red Sea. Therefore, no illegality is claimed. It is worth remembering that, in reality, the only two wars that have been legal from 1945 to the present are exclusively the Korean War and the first Gulf War. Both were endorsed and thus made legal by the UN Security Council. t is evident that in the current context, where the right of veto would allow Russia or China to prevent any resolution endorsed by the United States, military actions may formally be at odds with the concept of the legitimacy of war. Nevertheless, the United Nations has adopted a resolution for a ceasefire, approved by 11 members (with the Russian Federation abstaining). The resolution followed a previous meeting between UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and the Iranian Foreign Minister with the aim «to maintain a conducive environment for constructive dialogue and concerted regional efforts supported for peace in Yemen».[12]
The involvement of European nations is another significant aspect of this crisis. Spain officially communicated the lifting of the veto on the European Union’s participation in the mission in the Red Sea but declared that it would not actively participate.[13] The Ministry of Defence had issued a press release clearly stating Madrid’s position. To overcome Spanish opposition, the White House exerted considerable pressure, culminating in a phone call from Joe Biden to Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. It is also noteworthy to mention the cooperation of Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Greece. A sort of “call to arms” invoked by Washington and promptly heeded by its European (and beyond) partners.[14]
Consequences and Future Prospects for Washington
At present, the United States finds itself directly or indirectly involved on three fronts: Ukraine, Israel, and Yemen. In an era where Washington emphasizes “America First,” almost as a sign of neo-isolationism, it ultimately disperses energies on issues that, in some cases (as seen in the situation in Ukraine), it would prefer to leave to its European allies. In other cases, such as the fight against Hamas and the Houthi rebels (indirectly involving Iran), the U.S. ends up supporting fronts that, in the optimistic plans of the White House, it would have preferred to avoid. This is because the century’s challenge for the United States is the fight against the rising superpower China and consequently, the potential future front that could open up around the island of Taiwan. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that if the attacks conducted in recent weeks do not yield the expected results and the Houthi rebels maintain their position in solidarity with the neighbouring Palestinians, the White House may find itself having to redirect valuable assets from the South China Sea to address an expanding Middle Eastern conflict. This risk arises at a critical moment for the Biden administration, facing a complex campaign for presidential re-election and unable to afford such a prospect.[15]
Note
[1] Yemen, chi sono gli Houthi e perché hanno attaccato una nave italiana nel Mar Rosso, SkyTG24, 2024. https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/approfondimenti/houthi-chi-sono#
[2] United Nations Security Council, “Panel of Experts on Yemen”, 26 gennaio 2018.
[3] Saudi Arabia close to deal to buy $1.15bn worth of military equipment from US, The Guardian, 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/saudi-arabia-close-to-deal-to-buy-115bn-worth-of-military-equipment-from-us.
[4] Dossier Senato della Repubblica, La guerra nello Yemen: eventi, attori e scenari del conflitto dalla “primavera araba” alla “svolta” di Biden, marzo 2021.
[5] Ibidem.
[6] G. Gagliano, Ecco perché gli Stati Uniti continuano a vendere armi all’Arabia Saudita, Startmag, 2021. https://www.startmag.it/mondo/stati-uniti-arabia-saudita-accordo-armi/
[7] Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen, US Department of Defense, 2024.
[8] «Secretary Atnhony Blinken and NATO Secreteray General at a Joint Press Availability», US Department of Defense, 2024.
[9] Council on Foreign Relations report Us raids, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen
[10] M. Biral, Yemen, la minaccia Houthi nel Mar Rosso: le possibili ripercussioni globali, Opinio Juris, 2023. https://www.opiniojuris.it/opinio/yemen-la-minaccia-houthi-nel-mar-rosso-le-possibili-ripercussioni-globali/
[11] L’Iran condanna gli attacchi di Usa e Gb in Yemen, Ansa, 2024. https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/topnews/2024/01/12/liran-condanna-gli-attacchi-di-usa-e-gb-in-yemen_14963819-63f1-4d49-927f-1a060bcf7578.html
[12] G. Bianchi, L’Onu chiede agli Houthi lo stop agli attacchi alle navi nel Mar Rosso, AGI, 2024. https://www.agi.it/estero/news/2024-01-17/onu-houthi-stop-attacco-navi-mar-rosso-24875727/#:~:text=nel%20Mar%20Rosso-,L’Onu%20chiede%20agli%20Houthi%20lo%20stop%20agli,alle%20navi%20nel%20Mar%20Rosso&text=AGI%20%2D%20Le%20Nazioni%20Unite%20chiedono,l’emittente%20araba%20Al%20Jazeera.
[13] G. Gaiani, Rischi, conseguenze e aspetti critici dell’operazione navale contro gli Houthi, AnalisiDifesa, 2024. https://www.analisidifesa.it/2023/12/rischi-conseguenze-e-aspetti-critici-delloperazione-navale-a-guida-usa-contro-gli-houthi/
[14] Ibidem.
[15] S. Ritter, Consequences of the Houthi Attack, Energy Intelligence, 2024.