How many and whose, an analysis of the weapons systems used by Russia in Ukraine.

By Lorenzo Cominotto

Russia has invested in the military in order to create a modern, purely Russian army, no longer dependant on Soviet leftovers. We could say that the plan worked, if only Russia was a normal country with just defence and deterrence goals. Its overconfidence and aggressive foreign policy have indeed made it rely once again on Soviet iron.

Introduction

In the decade prior the escalation of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation widely sponsored the modernisation of its army, both in armament and doctrine. Learning from the lessons in Chechnya and Georgia, and despite having a significantly smaller GDP share to invest in the military compared with Soviet times, it was willing to create a modern army and credible deterrence.
The most prominent of these operations was the GPV-2020 (gosudarstvennaia programma vooruzheniia) started in 2010[1].
Despite these ambitious and expensive plans, the Russian doctrine has more in common with the former Soviet army than with the new socio-economic order of the country[2]. Therefore, since little in the doctrine has changed, what about the weapons?
This analysis will show data from Oryx (Oryxspioenkop[3]), a Dutch open-source intelligence (OSINT) website that counts the number of confirmed vehicle losses (destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured) throughout the war in Ukraine based on photographic evidence.
It goes without saying that these numbers will be an underestimation of the actual ones, since not all the losses are caught on camera. Nevertheless, they will provide us with a general idea of which types of vehicles are engaged in more combats.
It should also be noted that the actual production numbers of Russian vehicle are not accurate, especially in wartime.

The modernisation

At the beginning of the century, Russian conventional forces were incapable of carrying out important defence tasks. Therefore, the state was overly reliant on nuclear forces.
Before the escalation of the war in Ukraine, following almost 15 years of sustained investment, Russia’s conventional forces became more commensurate with its defence and security goals[4].
The plan was threatened by internal problems such as stagnant and resource-dependent economy, declining population and brain drain. The war in Ukraine, with declining forces and sanctions, only exacerbated these issues.
But, even during the post-Soviet period, where these same problems were even worse, the Russian Federation developed a new generation of hypersonic missiles, air defences, and nuclear weapons. Russia has therefore proven that it is able not only to carry late-Soviet designs to fruition, but also to develop a follow-on generation of capabilities[5].
During this analysis, it should be noted that modernisation does not just mean introducing new weapons systems or ideas, but rather upgrading existing equipment and, in some cases, introducing into service capabilities that were planned decades earlier.
The decision to upgrade in-service designs, instead of developing new projects, is also prompted by the optimistic entry-into-service dates required by the Kremlin. On the one hand, this does not require substantial changes in industrial capabilities, on the other, it does not fulfil the long-term goals of the armed forces.
The program was underpinned by increased defence expenditure. All armed force branches have benefited from increased funding, though some more than others. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies «strategic and aerospace forces have profited the most from re-equipment, while the Navy has struggled, for example, to meet surface-ship ambitions. Procurement goals for the Ground Forces have also failed to be met in some key areas, such as heavy armour»[6].
The same think tank also underlined how it was unlikely that the target of an inventory consisting of 70% modern equipment would have been reached by the end of the year (2020); nevertheless, the plan had succeeded more than it had failed[7].

Ground forces

The idea was to create a modern Russian army, based on well-equipped forces built around professional rather than conscript personnel.
However, due to the prolonged war, the Kremlin now relied on the mobilisation of conscript soldiers, and this had and impact on the consistency of ground forces equipment.
According to Oryx, Russia has lost 3382[8] tanks so far, whose production dates range from the 50s to the present day.

• 1390 of them were Soviet-era vehicles (T-54; T-55; T-62 and variants; T-64 and variants; T-72 and v.; T-80 and v.)
• 1379 were modernised vehicle or newly produced tanks based on Soviet-era projects (T-62M Obr. 2022 T-62MV Obr. 2022; T-72B Obr. 2022, T-72BA, B3, B3 Obr. 2014, 2016 and 2022; T-80BV Obr. 2022, T-80U, UK, UE-1, UM2, BVM, BVM Obr. 2022; T-90A, AK, S, M).
• 613 other tanks could not be properly identified, therefore they will not be counted.

Besides the T-90 – which entered production in 1992 but was entirely designed in Soviet times and was based on the Soviet T-72 – no Russian designed tank, such as the infamous T-14 Armata, has seen combat in Ukraine so far.
Of 2769 recognisable tanks, 50.20% were outdated Soviet-era tanks and 49.80% were proper Russian-made tanks or modernised Soviet ones.
On Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), Oryx counts respectively 1578 and 4566 knocked out machines[9].

• 3790 of these vehicles were Soviet heritage (BRM-1(K); BRDM-2; BTR-80 and variants; MT-LB and v.; 2S1; BMM-80; BMP-1(P); BMP-2(K); BMP-2D; BMD-2).
• 1879 were modernised or brand-new vehicles (BMPT Terminator; BRM-1K Obr. 2021; BRDM-2M/A; Vityaz DT-10PM and DT-30; GAZ-3344-20 “Aleut”; BMP-1AM; BMP-1 675-sb3KDZ; BMP-1AM 675-sb3KDZ; BMP-2M Berezhok, 2 675-sb3KDZ, 2M 675-sb3KDZ; BMP-3, 3 Obr.2020, 688A-sb6-2KP and 4S24 NKDZ; MT-LBM 6MB; BMD-4M; BTR-82A(M) and 82AT).
• 475 AFV and IFV are listed as unknown.

Of 5669 recognisable AFV and IFV, 66.85% were vehicles coming straight from Soviet deposits, 33.15% were new or modernised vehicle.
To note, the Russian designed BMD-4, produced at the beginning of the century, derives many components from its Soviet ancestors. To contrast, the BMPT Terminator, even though the ground idea was born after the Soviet-Afghan war, can be considered a fully Russian design. It has, however, seen very little action in Ukraine.
Regarding towed artillery, self propelled artillery, and multiple rocket launchers, the situation is even more unbalanced towards the Soviet-produced guns. The first category sees only Soviet-produced weapons, the second counts only 61 Russian-produced guns on 388 recognisable (15.72%), while the third one sees 58 post-1991 systems on 413 (14.04%)[10].
As evidenced by their weapon systems, the Russian ground forces heavily rely on Soviet stocks. Most of their “modern” vehicles are whether decades-old modernised machines or newly produced vehicles based on slightly changed Soviet designs.
As stated, this is also due to the mobilisations of reserve personnel. It is possible that if, instead of a long war of attrition, the Russian army had had to face a local security threat using professional personnel, its share of modern weaponry would have been suited for the task.

Navy

The navy might be the branch that has suffered the most from delays and underfunding. Most of the project do not concern large surface ships; the Lider-class destroyer has seen delays and probably suspensions, while there are not encouraging news about a replacement for the terribly unreliable Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, which is a bad news also for the Russian carrier-borne aviation.
The development of the Yasen-class submarine has proceeded, even though badly behind schedule.
The main target of the Russian naval modernisation has concerned the deployment, on new and pre-existing ships, of naval-carried cruise missiles such as the 3M54-1 Kalibr (SS-N-30A Sagaris) and 3M22 Tsirkon (SS-N-33), which gave the Russian navy upgraded capabilities[11].
According to Oryx, Russia has lost (sunk or damaged): the Soviet Slava-class guided missile cruiser Moskva, 2 brand new Karakurt-class and 1 Soviet Tarantul-III-class corvettes, the 10 years old Kilo-class submarine Rostov-na-donu, 6 Soviet (Tapir, Ropucha, and Ondarta-classes) and 2 russian (the small Serna-class) landings ships. Alongside with several other Soviet and Russian smaller vessels[12].
In this case, it is more difficult to analyse the percentages due to the small number of cases. But, as mentioned, the Russian navy has not launched many new naval vehicles, therefore every loss in this category heavily damages the situation of the fleet.
However, we can consider the use of naval-launched cruise missiles, since they have been the focus of the modernisation.
The brand new Tsirkon missile has seen its maiden combat use on February 7, this year[13]. 2 of them have been used again on March 25[14], but they have been probably launched by mainland in Crimea[15], and it has been reported by Ukrainian sources that allegedly both were shot down in the slow-speed final path of the flight[16].
On the other hand, the ship-launched version of the Kalibr missile has seen more action throughout the war. This weapon has been in development since the 90s, but the naval-carried version entered combat service in 2015[17], and the modernisation concerned its installation on a larger number of vessels.
Due to its positive performance in Ukraine, in 2023 Russia declared that the Steregushchiy-class corvette and the soviet nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov will undergo modernisations to be armed with this missile. In addition, the newly produced Lada-class submarines will also integrate this weapon system[18].
We can then consider the missile modernisation fairy successful so far, even though quite slow-moving. The weapons themselves have proven capable, and more vessels are to receive them.
About the naval modernisation in general, the plan’s future was not meant to be bright since the beginning. The days of the mighty Soviet navy and its blue-water capabilities seem to be long gone, and it looks like there will be no future also for the Russian carrier-borne air power.
Despite several humiliations and losses caused by a country with no real navy, the Russian ships, equipped with modern and proven missile systems, can still pose a serious threat to any enemy, if properly commanded, trained and maintained.
Therefore, we can draw conclusions similar to the ones we have already seen about the ground forces: the Russian navy underwent a modernisation that would have kept it capable of defending the motherland by serious security threats, but not to properly project its power outside territorial waters. This war also showed how underestimate the enemy can cause serious damages to a fleet that was supposed to be unmatched in the Black Sea, and which has been relegated to increasingly less important roles due to its vulnerability to modern and asymmetric tactics used by Ukraine.

Aerospace forces

The aerospace forces have been one of the main receivers of funds for the modernisation but, despite this, it has had to watch key developments delayed.
Unlike the navy, however, it has had the possibility to rely on interim options.
For example, while the introduction of the Su-57 Felon combat aircraft, a main goal of the modernisation SAP 2020, was barely met within the year – and, to date, only around 15-20 are likely to be in frontline service, with one damaged by Ukraine in 2024 while on the ground[19] – the airforce was able to rely on the SU-35S Flanker M as a fair back-up. Likewise, the PAK-DA program for a new long-range bomber has seen delays, and the aerospace forces had to resort to the Tu-160 as filler. To note, the latter and the Tu-95MS Bear H have benefitted from continuing investments and modernisations over the years[20].
Oryx states how Russia has lost so far 128 fixed-wing aircrafts and 144 helicopters[21]. Among the losses we count:

• 109 combat aircrafts, 57 of which were modernised or Russian-produced planes (MiG-31BM, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-34M, Su-35S and Su-57), and 49 were Soviet airplanes (Su-25, Su-24M, Su-24MR, Su-27). 3 fighters were not recognisable.
• 5 strategic bombers (Tu-22M3 and Tu-95MS), produced in Soviet times. It is likely that these were part of the versions that had received modernisation kits in the last few years. Despite this, Oryx lists them as Soviet-era unmodernised aircrafts.
• 5 command and control aircrafts (Il-22(M) and Beriev A-50), listed as Soviet-era vehicles by Oryx, yet it is likely they had been part of the modernised fleet[22]. One Il-22(M) was lost at Wagner’s hand during its mutiny[23].
• 8 transport and utility aircrafts (Beriev Be-200, An-26, Il-76). 7 Soviet inherited and 1 modern planes.
• 144 helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-8MTPR-1, Mi-24P, Mi-24V/P/35M, Mi-35M, Mi-28, Ka-29, Ka-52), 7 variants are unknown, 5 helicopters were Soviet-era vehicles and 132 were Russian-developed and produced or Russian-produced Soviet-developed aircraft

Every loss of flying vehicles its obviously a huge cost both monetary and in capabilities, whether the planes are new or inherited from the URSS; in some cases, the lost of the latter are indeed even more dramatic than the ones of brand-new planes.
Besides the importance of damaging a Su-57 – the most modern plane in service in the Russian fleet – the lost of Soviet-era aircrafts such as Il-22, A-50 and Tu-22M3 are a big problem for the Kremlin. These planes are not only essential for Russia’s early warning, radar detection, surveillance, control, coordination and strike capabilities, they are also available in very limited numbers, respectively: up to 12[24] Il-22, 6[25] or 7[26] A-50 in service condition (its replacement, the A-100, seems still a little far from being fielded soon, indeed new A-50 are being built to close the gap[27]) and 57[28] Tu-22M3, of which only 27[29] in operable condition.
If all the projects for modern airplanes had been in advanced stages by now, Russian Aerospace forces would have been one of the most capable around the world.
This does not mean that they are not, they possess big numbers of very capable and fairly modern jet fighters, but they are critically shortcoming in airframes that are less flashy than fighters, but which are essential not only in a largest war, but also in Ukraine.

Conclusions

A common element we have found in each paragraph is how, thanks to these modernisation plans, Russia’s army branches could undoubtedly have been capable of defending the homeland against most threats; but as this war has shown, its ability to project its power – even in relatively small close-by countries – has been seriously questioned and its critical weapons arsenal has been severely affected.
The Kremlin’s military, especially ground forces, still have to rely on Soviet leftovers due to mobilisation and high losses during the war in Ukraine. The armoured force has returned to the Soviet large numbers policy, while the navy has had to be relegated to minor roles and does not have many big projects in sight.
The airforce can claim good combat capabilities, but it has as well to depend on Soviet vehicles for essential capability such early warning, radar control and command.
We should also not exclude the considerable damage caused to the deterrence of the Kremlin’s marketing campaigns. If the war had not shed light on the fact that some Russian capabilities have been oversold by the propaganda, the world would have continued to consider the Russian army far more capable than how it has performed in Ukraine, and its actual number of modern weapons would have been sufficient to maintain the illusion.

Note

[1] Connolly, R., & Sendstad, C. (2018). Russian rearmament: An assessment of defense-industrial performance. Problems of Post-Communism, 65(3), 143-160. Cit. p. 143
[2] Pietkiewicz, M. (2018). The military doctrine of the Russian Federation. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 47(3), 505-520. Cit. pp. 508-509
[3] In: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/
[4] McDermott, R., & Bartles, C. (2020). Russias Military Modernisation: An Assessment. The international Insitute for Strategic Studies, p. 179
[5] Kofman, M., Connolly, R., Emonds, J., Kendall-Taylor, A., & Bendett, S. (2022). Assessing Russian State Capacity to Develop and Deploy Advanced Military Technology. Transatlantic Security Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), p. 1 
[6] McDermott & Bartles, op. cit.
[7] Ivi, p. 182
[8] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
[9] Ivi.
[10] Ivi.
[11] McDermott & Bartles, Ivi, p. 181
[12] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
[13] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/13/europe/ukraine-russia-zircon-hypersonic-missile-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
[14] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/26/war-in-ukraine-russia-steps-up-strikes-on-kyiv-s-energy-infrastructure_6657030_4.html
[15] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/03/29/7448835/
[16] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/04/02/russia-war-hypersonic-ukraine-zircon-strikes-naval-missile/
[17] https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/
[18] https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/03/10/russian-navy-to-upgrade-vessels-with-kalibr-cruise-missiles/
[19] Bronk, P., (2024). Damaged Su-57 Emphasises the Vulnerability of Russian Airbases Near Ukraine. RUSI.
[20] McDermott & Bartles, op. cit.
[21] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html
[22] https://theaviationist.com/2024/01/15/ukraine-shot-down-a-russian-a-50-radar-aircraft-and-an-il-22-airborne-command-post/
[23] Stepanenko, K., Hird, K., Bailey, R., Evans, A. & Clark, M. (2023). Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW Press. [24]https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/26748#:~:text=The%20Il%2D22M%20is%20part,in%20their%20war%20against%20Ukraine
[25] https://www.newsweek.com/russia-only-has-six-50-spy-planes-left-kyiv-1873164
[26] https://www.twz.com/air/russia-building-more-dated-a-50-radar-planes-is-desperate-but-may-be-necessary
[27] Ivi.
[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-russian-bomber-plane-that-ukraine-says-it-shot-down-2024-04-19/
[29] https://kyivindependent.com/intelligence-chief-russia-has-27-operable-tu-22m3-bombers-left-after-latest-strikes/

Photo: Cars pass by destroyed Russian tanks in a recent battle against Ukrainians in the village of Dmytrivka, close to Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, May 23, 2022. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)