The westernmost region and Russia’s Only exclave remains a constant challenge for the country.
By Francesco Iovine
During the second half of the 18th century, in a city of the Kingdom of Prussia, namely Königsberg in the East Prussian region, the evening walks of the philosopher Immanuel Kant contributed to the “Copernican revolution” he developed, centered on the subject and moral law. A projection of the philosopher into 2024 would find him in a transformed city, almost unrecognizable to his eyes. This leap of three centuries serves as a profound example of how international powers can reshape places, modifying territories once unrelated to them in their own image.
In today’s geopolitical landscape, the Kaliningrad Oblast is an important point of interest for Russia on one side, and NATO and the European Union countries on the other. This region’s peculiarity lies in its being a landmass of just over 15,000 km² detached from Russia, forming an exclave located between Poland and Lithuania. The war in Ukraine and the resulting tensions between European states and the Russian Federation have made Kaliningrad a constant challenge across several strategic sectors. As previously mentioned, it was an integral part of East Prussia, the foundational core of German unification in the 19th century, but it has been part of Russia since 1945. The end of World War II led to the dismemberment of the historic Prussian region, bringing much of it into the direct orbit of the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation maintained control over it.
Thus, the brief considerations made far highlight, at a superficial analytical level, the strategic importance of Kaliningrad and its eponymous oblast. This article aims to analyse its recent history (from a historical and economic perspective), as well as the relevant strategic, security, and geopolitical components, the latter emphasized by the conflict in Ukraine.
From Königsberg to Kaliningrad
Between 1945 and 1946, the East Prussian region was dismembered and erased from geographical maps. As established by the 1945 Potsdam Conference[1], the Soviet Union legitimized its dominance over the Baltic Sea, following the conquest of the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940. The Soviet dominance of the Baltic basin was solidified with the annexation of the heart of former East Prussia, namely the region of the capital Königsberg[2]. This area underwent a name change, becoming Kaliningrad in honor of Mikhail Kalinin, a prominent Soviet figure who held, among other roles, the position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR[3]. The Kaliningrad region became part of the Russian SFSR, maintaining the same borders observed today. The Soviet authorities adopted a very rigid approach to the territory, particularly concerning its strategic nature: militarization[4].
The important position on the Baltic allowed the Soviet Union to make Kaliningrad a strategic hub for the Red Army, exploiting the position of the port of Baltyisk, located at the entrance of the Vistula Lagoon, which became the base for the Soviet Baltic fleet[5]. Thus, the Kaliningrad region, in the context of the Cold War, was incorporated into the broader deterrence policy typical of the second half of the 20th century. In particular, the Baltic projection of the region was crucial for blocking the Danish Straits in the event of a potential confrontation between NATO forces and those of the Warsaw Pact.
The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation did not bring a strategic shift in this regard, despite changing strategic needs. Indeed, the Baltic fleet of the Russian Federation remains stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast[6], in the same locations established in the 1940s by Soviet authorities.
Historically, the Soviet and later Russian rule over the region represents a contemporary peculiarity. On one hand, the region is perceived as Russian[7]—just over 80% of those who declared their ethnicity are Russian[8], out of a total population of one million[9]. However, the key consideration for analyzing the territory is to regard it as a “young Russian.” Its former association with Germany was progressively erased, particularly during the Soviet era, through extensive russification of the area. The German-speaking population was expelled from the region, which was repopulated by Soviet citizens (mostly Russians[10]), who significantly altered the territory architecturally[11], as much of the city, already devastated by the Second World War, experienced a sovietization of its spaces, with the construction of buildings featuring the harsh lines and brutalist style of the era[12]. The landscape of Kaliningrad bears witnesses to this radical transformation, symbolized by the House of Soviet[13]s.
The “Fourth Baltic Republic”[14]
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought forth a significant debate about the new nature that could be attributed to the Kaliningrad Oblast and its capital. The hopes that spread in the early 1990s and the initial years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency were primarily about the potential establishment of a special economic zone[15], whose characteristics would allow the region to develop autonomously and prosperously, thanks to the influx of foreign capital capable of investing in the area. In this sense, a political-administrative plan for Kaliningrad was promoted, characterized by less centralist guidelines and broadly traceable within the federal structure that Russia was adopting. The development plan proposed the creation of a republic with high levels of economic autonomy. This idea stemmed from the exclave’s geographical position, which, being detached from the main body of the Federation, about 1,289 km from Moscow[16], could benefit from increased cooperation with the immediately neighboring states, namely Poland to the south and Lithuania to the east[17].
Contrary to these hopes, such openness in this direction did not occur, favoring instead a process of administrative simplification in some cases—such as the creation of a special economic zone in 1992 that facilitated the influx of foreign investors—or the establishment of a Special Administrative Area (SAA)[18] in 2018. These attempts should be interpreted through a dual lens, highlighting, at a superficial level, an autonomy experiment in favor of the detached Baltic entity. At a deeper level, it becomes evident that Kaliningrad is considered secondary economically, heavily dependent on the central administration. This makes Kaliningrad a weak territory in multiple aspects, including the geoeconomic one[19]. The Oblast’s dependence on the central government is such that it constantly risks its stability.
A Narrow and Risky Corridor
Particularly in the context of tense relations between the European Union and Russia, the Kaliningrad region finds itself between two very hot fires. The primary consideration in this case is the supply chain from Russia to Kaliningrad. This issue is of strategic importance to many of the actors involved, as it constitutes fertile ground for clashes and tensions, which have occurred repeatedly.
Since 2003[20][21], there has been an agreement—the Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD[22])—between Russia and the European Union to facilitate the transit of goods to the territory of Kaliningrad through the so-called Suwalki Corridor. This corridor forms the border between Lithuania and Poland and connects the Kaliningrad Oblast to Belarus. The geostrategic importance of the Suwalki Corridor is significant for the European Union, NATO, and Russia alike.
First, for the EU and NATO, it is a critical connection point between Poland and the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), whose proximity to the Russian giant has historically been an existential threat. In this context, Kaliningrad plays an essential role, as evidenced by its military significance. As mentioned earlier, the region serves as the main base of the Baltic fleet at the port of Baltyisk[23]. Moreover, Russian military capability is concentrated in the region at several points, including the two air bases of Chkalovsk and Chernyakhovsk[24], and the deployment of the 11th Army Corps, which was also used during the conflict in Ukraine. This military capability would easily allow Russia to block the corridor, facilitating an encirclement of the three Baltic republics[25]. This prospect has been repeatedly addressed, discussed, and analyzed. In line with this, it is no coincidence that the three republics fully comply with the 2% GDP military spending target[26].
Secondly, given the above considerations, the eastern flank is seen as the weak link of the entire alliance. The ability to defend a space like the Suwalki Corridor is significantly reduced should Russia launch a preemptive attack, deploying tactical nuclear weapons[27], which are likely partly present in the Kaliningrad Oblast as well[28]. The entries of Finland and Sweden in 2023 and 2024, respectively, have strengthened the Alliance’s presence in the Baltic, contributing to a substantial deterrence effort — recently considered still weak[29] — in response to nuclear threats from Putin and his government.
Conclusions
The Kaliningrad region occupies a significant international position, even though it is somewhat sidelined. Its belonging to a nuclear power, like the Russian Federation, reinforces its central role in Russia’s deterrence and threat strategy. However, Russia manages the territory through a dual directive, hierarchically arranged: on one hand, the primary military importance, making Kaliningrad fundamental for the Russian military; on the other hand, a lack of focus on the economic front, favoring limited supply methods and discouraging other types of connections—such as maritime or air, which are used less—leading the region to a state of constant precarious balance, especially in an unpeaceful European theater.
Note
[1] Berlin (Potsdam) Conference (Report on the tripartite conference of Berlin). (1945). https://maint.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1224.pdf
[2] Varsori, A. (2020) Storia Internazionale: Dal 1919 a oggi (p.154, 2a ed.). Il Mulino
[3] Dizionario di Storia. (2010). Kalinin, Michail Ivanovič. Treccani. https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/michail-ivanovic-kalinin/
[4] Cordes, M. J. (2024). HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE. In KALININGRAD OBLAST 2024: Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea (pp. 9–12). Danish Institute for International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep60376.5
[5] Veitch, K. W. (1984) The Warsaw Pact Baltic Fleet (p.24). Naval Postgraduate school https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36712849.pdf
[6] Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation. (s.d.). Baltic Fleet. https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/navy/associations/structure/forces/type/navy/baltic/about.htm
[7] The russian ethnic issue was argued within the follow article: Iovine, F. (2024, 28 agosto). La Russia tra terrorismo, etnie e sicurezza. Opinio Juris https://www.opiniojuris.it/opinio/la-russia-tra-terrorismo-etnie-e-sicurezza/
[8] Cordes, M.J. (2024). KALININGRAD OBLAST TODAY. In KALININGRAD OBLAST 2024: Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea (pp. 13-24). Danish Institute for International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep60376.6
[9] ROSSTAT. (2023). Russian Statistical Yearbook. https://eng.rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Yearbook%202023.pdf
[10] Ibidem
[11] The following article perfectly explains the Oblast’ russianization: Cau, E. (2022, 22 giugno). Che cos’è Kaliningrad. Il Post. https://www.ilpost.it/2022/06/22/kaliningrad/
[12] Goni, L. (2022, 11 maggio). Konigsberg – Kaliningrad: la città che visse due volte. Mente politica. https://www.mentepolitica.it/articolo/konigsberg-a-kaliningrad-la-citt-che-visse-due-volte/2253
[13] L. Shvartsbreim, Y. (2013). Dom Sovietov Kaliningrad. Atchitectuul. https://architectuul.com/architecture/dom-sovietov-kaliningrad
[14] This denomination was conceived during the early 90s in the hope for Kaliningrad of liberalization and free market regulation through the institution of a Special Economic Zone. To deepen the issue: Holtom, P. (2003). A ‘Baltic Republic in the Russian Federation’ or the ‘Fourth Baltic Republic’? Kaliningrad’s Regional Programme in the 1990s. Journal of Baltic Studies, 34(2).
[15] Moses, J. C. (2004). The Politics of Kaliningrad Oblast: A Borderland of the Russian Federation. The Russian Review, 63(1), 107–129. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664694
[16] Kaliningrad region. (s.d.). Knoema. https://knoema.com/atlas/Russian-Federation/Kaliningrad-Region
[17] Holtom, P. (2003.). A ‘Baltic Republic in the Russian Federation’ or the ‘Fourth Baltic Republic’? Kaliningrad’s Regional Programme in the 1990s. Journal of Baltic Studies, 34(2).
[18] Cordes, M. J. (2024). KALININGRAD OBLAST TODAY. In KALININGRAD OBLAST 2024: Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea (pp. 13–24). Danish Institute for International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep60376.6
[19] Moses, J. C. (2004). The Politics of Kaliningrad Oblast: A Borderland of the Russian Federation. The Russian Review, 63(1), 107–129. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3664694
[20] Burac, M. (2023, 4 gennaio). Il nodo di Kaliningrad e il Baltico tra NATO e Russia. Aspenia. https://aspeniaonline.it/il-nodo-di-kaliningrad-e-il-baltico-tra-nato-e-russia/
[21] Cordes, M. J. (2024). THE WAR IN UKRAINE: THE ROLE OF KALININGRAD OBLAST. In KALININGRAD OBLAST 2024: Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea (pp. 41–46). Danish Institute for International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep60376.9
[22] COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 693/2003 of 14 April 2003 establishing a specific Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual, Regulation n. 693 (2003) (European Unione). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0693
[23] Ibidem
[24] Cordes, M. J. (2024). KALININGRAD OBLAST TODAY. In KALININGRAD OBLAST 2024: Russia’s vessel of havoc on the Baltic Sea (pp. 13–24). Danish Institute for International Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep60376.6
[25] Sakkov, S. (2019). Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO’s North-Eastern border. NDC POLICY BRIEF, 13.
[26] NATO. (2024). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2024) (p.3). https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf
[27] Sakkov, S. (2019). Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO’s North-Eastern border. NDC POLICY BRIEF, 13.
[28] KRISTENSEN, H. M. (2012). CASE STORY: THE KALININGRAD DISTRICT. In Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (pp. 70–78). Federation of American Scientists.
[29] Mattelaer, A., & Verstraete, W. (2022, 27 giugno). Why Europe Needs a Nuclear Deterrence Renaissance. ISPI. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/why-europe-needs-nuclear-deterrence-renaissance-35568
Foto copertina: Kaliningrad