The High Cost of Defense

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NATO’s Spending Push and the Constitutional Future of European Defence and Welfare

by Marzia Genovese[1]

Introduction

At its summit in The Hague on 22-23 June 2025, NATO Member States reached a landmark agreement[2] to raise national defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with an interim review in 2029. The pledge – comprising 3.5% for conventional defense and 1.5% for supporting infrastructure, cyber capabilities and military mobility – was presented as a necessary response to evolving global threats and the ongoing war in Ukraine[3]. However, it was also the result of persistent pressure from the United States[4], which has repeatedly criticised European allies for allegedly under-investing in collective defense. Whilst all NATO members signed on, Spain refused to endorse the 5% target[5], citing concerns over economic feasibility and social cohesion, and secured a formal waiver from the obligation[6].
For the European Union (EU), whose Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[7] is still under development and legally distinct from NATO, the implications of this decision are profound. As 23 of the 27 EU Member States are also NATO members, the 5% target risks shaping national defense policies through an external military alliance, whilst marginalising EU-driven initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation[8] (PESCO), the European Defence Fund[9] (EDF) and the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence[10].
This blog post argues that the NATO 5% pledge undermines the EU’s constitutional identity as a peace project, erodes its strategic autonomy and imposes a fiscal-military path incompatible with EU law. As Mattias Kumm recently observed[11], the last NATO summit failed to articulate a vision of peace and diplomacy, instead reinforcing a logic of militarisation.
Although the NATO decision was adopted outside the EU’s legal framework, its implications are not legally irrelevant to the Union. The EU has no competence over NATO decisions, and CSDP remains primarily intergovernmental, with minimal parliamentary involvement as established by Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, when NATO decisions shape national spending priorities, industrial procurement and public investment across 23 EU Member States, they inevitably interact with domains governed by EU law (including the internal market, budgetary policy, social rights and the Union’s stated constitutional values). This post does not claim that the 5% target violates EU law; rather, it seeks to examine how a decision taken externally may exert structural and normative pressure on the EU’s legal order, particularly its commitments to peace, welfare and democratic values under Articles 3 and 21 TEU.

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Undermining Strategic Autonomy

The NATO commitment to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 constitutes a real challenge to the EU’s long-standing aspiration for strategic autonomy. That concept – central to the current EU’s global positioning – was defined as the Union’s “capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible” in the 2016 Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence[12]. In recent years, strategic autonomy has been invoked not only in the defense sphere, but also in the context of industrial policy, energy security and public health[13]. However, the 5% pledge – adopted within NATO, mostly at the initiative of the United States (US)[14] – effectively reorients national defense budgets toward NATO-led objectives, many of which reflect US strategic and economic concerns more than European priorities. Whilst the EU formally sees NATO as the cornerstone of collective defense for its members[15], the Lisbon Treaty carefully balances complementarity with autonomy. Article 42(2) TEU makes clear that the CSDP is “an integral part of the common foreign and security policy” and that it “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”.
Further, Article 42(7) TEU introduces a mutual assistance clause, akin to NATO’s Article 5[16], which obliges EU Member States to aid one another if attacked. This clause was invoked only once (by France after the 2015 Paris attacks[17]) and is meant to support a distinct EU security identity[18]. By contrast, the 5% GDP pledge positions NATO as the effective decision-maker on European defense posture, weakening the legal significance of these treaty-based commitments.
This strategic dependence is not new, but the current direction represents an escalation. Despite major investments – such as the European Defence Fund[19] and PESCO[20] – the EU’s efforts remain fragmented, often subordinated to NATO’s operational framework. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept asserts the alliance’s commitment to “a 360-degree approach” to deterrence and defense[21], signalling a shift from a Euro-Atlantic to a global security posture. In addition to identifying Russia as the most direct threat, the document frames China as a systemic challenge and emphasises engagement in the Indo-Pacific – regions and priorities that extend well beyond the EU’s geostrategic focus.
This dependency is further entrenched by the fact that a significant portion of new defense spending will be used to purchase military equipment from the United States[22], which remains the dominant global supplier of advanced weaponry. In 2023 alone, 55% of European defense imports came from the US[23], and major NATO-aligned procurement (including F-35 fighter jets, missile defense systems and surveillance technology) are consistently routed through American defence contractors[24]. The 5% spending target thus risks functioning as a de facto subsidy to the US military-industrial complex, further debilitating Europe’s defense industrial base and undermining the EU’s stated goal of achieving technological and industrial sovereignty[25].
Unless the EU reasserts its leadership in defense planning and procurement coordination, its vision of strategic autonomy risks becoming hollow. What remains is a Union structurally and financially embedded in a security framework governed by another organisation, led by another power and based on another set of priorities.

What Space for Peace and Diplomacy?

The 2025 The Hague NATO summit was remarkable not only for what it included (dramatic increases in defense budgets) but also for what it excluded: any substantive discussion of diplomacy, peacebuilding or arms control. The failure to articulate a vision of peace and diplomacy was not an accident but a symptom of a deeper political shift. In prioritising deterrence and militarisation, NATO leaders sidelined the legal and ethical frameworks that have historically underpinned the European project.
This omission is not merely rhetorical: it represents a potential breach of the EU’s constitutional framework, which affirms peace not just as a political objective, but as a legal commitment. Article 3(1) TEU explicitly states that the Union “aims to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”[26]. Article 21 TEU goes further, establishing that the EU’s external action “shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation”, including the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, and shall aim to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security”[27]. The NATO summit’s near-total absence of peace-oriented discourse stands in sharp contrast to these treaty obligations. There was no mention of renewing arms control agreements, no reference to multilateral disarmament frameworks and no strategy for ending the war in Ukraine beyond alleged deterrence and continued arms supplies. Instead, the alliance reaffirmed its 2022 Strategic Concept, which redefined NATO as a collective ‘defense’ organisation “in an era of strategic competition” and emphasised a global military posture without clear limits[28].
This militarised framing not only sparks constitutional dissonance but also undermines the EU’s normative power in the international system. Questionably[29], the EU has long claimed to act as a force for peace[30] and law, with a distinct identity from traditional great powers. If EU Member States now anchor their foreign policy within NATO’s power-politics logic – driven by US geostrategic priorities – they risk abandoning that constitutional narrative.
Finally, the marginalisation of peace and diplomacy raises serious concerns about transparency and democratic oversight. Whilst national parliaments will likely play a role in approving future military budgets, the 5% pledge exemplifies a wider pattern of executive-dominated decision-making in security and defense – one that risks sidelining democratic deliberation in areas of growing constitutional significance.

Welfare vs Warfare

The NATO pledge to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 implies a massive budgetary realignment in virtually all EU Member States who are parties to the alliance. Whilst the commitment was made outside the EU legal order, its consequences will unfold within it: national budgets, industrial policies and fiscal priorities will all be reshaped around a goal that was not debated publicly, nor necessarily backed by the democratic will of European citizens.  The reallocation of public resources on this scale necessarily raises the question: can European democracies sustain their welfare states whilst militarising at this pace?
Across the EU, constitutional texts anchor public policy in social justice. For instance, Germany’s Sozialstaatsprinzip is a foundational pillar of the Basic Law[31] (Art. 20), obliging the state to secure material conditions for human dignity and equality. Italy’s Constitution (Art. 3) mandates the removal of economic and social barriers to full individual development. In Spain, Article 1(1) declares the country a “social and democratic state”, and Articles 41-43 impose positive obligations to protect health, pensions and social welfare. Spain’s refusal to adopt the 5% pledge was explicitly framed as a defence of these constitutional priorities[32].
Moreover, empirical research suggests that increased military spending in NATO countries tends to crowd out public investment in social protection, particularly in health systems, education and infrastructure. A recent cross-national study found a statistically significant correlation between defense spending increases and reductions in social expenditure or higher out-of-pocket costs for essential services[33]. As EU Member States face mounting demographic[34], environmental[35] and housing[36] challenges, the prospect of diverting 5% of GDP to military budgets may entail cuts that go far beyond mere technocratic adjustment.
This tension is becoming politically salient. In France, opposition parties across the spectrum have criticised President Macron’s call for sharply increased military budgets amidst rising poverty and stagnant wages[37]. In Slovenia, the government recently proposed a consultative referendum on NATO membership[38], implicitly questioning the social and fiscal sustainability of deeper military integration.
At stake is not merely a question of economic prudence, but of constitutional vision. Europe’s post-war constitutional settlement is built on the idea that peace, prosperity and welfare are mutually reinforcing. By shifting the centre of gravity from social cohesion to military readiness – especially under external pressure – the 5% pledge risks distorting this normative foundation. As civil society organisations such as Counter Balance and ENAAT have argued[39], the EU is approaching a “point of no return” between warfare and welfare[40], one that demands urgent democratic deliberation and legal scrutiny.

Conclusion

The decision by NATO member states to commit to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 marks a turning point in Europe’s security posture, but also in its constitutional and normative orientation. Whilst the agreement was formally adopted within NATO and outside the EU’s institutional framework, its consequences will be felt deeply inside the Union: in national budgets, legislative priorities and the evolving balance between defense, diplomacy and welfare.
This blog post has argued that the 5% pledge undermines the EU’s strategic autonomy, not only by reinforcing Europe’s military and industrial dependence on the United States, but also by sidelining existing EU-led defense frameworks such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund. It has shown how the agreement marginalises diplomacy and peacebuilding, in potential contradiction with Articles 3 and 21 TEU, which affirm peace as a constitutional value and legal objective. It has further demonstrated how the required fiscal reallocation may threaten social rights and constitutional commitments in Member States, particularly where public services are already under pressure[41] and parliamentary control over defense spending has been weak or bypassed[42].
This is not to deny that security challenges are real, or that defense investments may be necessary. But what is at stake is the mode and direction of Europe’s response: whether it is guided by democratic accountability and constitutional values, or by external pressures and executive fiat. In this regard, the Spanish government’s refusal to subscribe to the 5% NATO target offers a valuable counterexample: a reaffirmation that national priorities and democratic values need not be sacrificed on the altar of militarisation.
As the EU moves forward, it must urgently reclaim a deliberative and legally grounded role in shaping Europe’s security trajectory. The question, ultimately, is not whether Europe should defend itself, but what kind of Europe it is defending[43].

Note

[1] Marzia Genovese is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Pau (France). She holds a doctorate in European Law from the University of Bologna (Italy) and an LLM in European Law from the University of Edinburgh (UK). Marzia graduated from the University of Bologna with a J.D. in Law with First Class Honours. She has been a Visiting Doctoral Fellow at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, in Lima. She has worked for the main energy company in Italy, as well as NGOs in Latin America and Europe on a wide range of matters, including environmental justice and legal defense of indigenous communities. Marzia has previously published for Peruvian legal journals and European blogs such as EU Law Live, EJIL:Talk! and European Law Blog.
[2] S. De La Feld, ‘NATO agrees to raise military spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, Spain secures waiver’ (Eunews, 23 June 2025).
[3] NATO, ‘NATO concludes historic Summit in The Hague’ (Press release), 25 June 2025.
[4] J. Cienski, ‘NATO allies agree to 5 percent defense spending goal’ (Politico, 22 June 2025).
[5] G. Blackburrn, ‘Spain’s PM Pedro Sánchez rejects NATO’s 5% of GDP spending plan as ‘unreasonable’’ (Euronews, 19 June 2025).
[6] M. González, ‘España pacta con la OTAN que no estará obligada a gastar el 5% del PIB en defensa’ (El País, 22 June 2025).
[7] See O. Krentz, ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (Fact Sheets), European Union, April 2025.
[8] See S. Blockmans and D. Macchiarini Crosson, ‘PESCO: A Force for Positive Integration in EU Defence’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2021, vol. 26, pp. 87-109.
[9] See R. Csernatoni and B. Oliveira Martins, ‘The European Defence Fund: Key Issues and Controversies’, PRIO Policy Brief no. 3, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2019.
[10] See EEAS, ‘Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: Report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council’, March 2024.
[11] M. Kumm, ‘The Failures of the NATO Summit and the Future of Peace: How European Leaders’ Obsequiousness Threatens Europe’s Security and Undermines International Law’ (Verfassungsblog, 27 June 2025).
[12] Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence’, Doc. 14149/16, 14 November 2016, p. 2.
[13] M. Damen, ‘EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity’ (Briefing), PE 733.589, European Union, July 2022.
[14] S. Erlanger and L. Jakes, ‘In a Win for Trump, NATO Agrees to a Big Increase in Military Spending’ (The New York Times, 25 June 2025).
[15] See B. Tangör, ‘NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: Where is it Heading?’, in PERCEPTIONS, 2021, Vol. XXVI, no. 1, pp. 73-99, a p. 89.
[16] NATO, Collective defence and Article 5, 4 July 2023.
[17] See F. Gouttefarde, ‘L’invocation de l’article 42§7 TUE : la solidarité militaire européenne contre le terrorisme’, in Revue Défense National, 2016, no. 788, pp. 68-76. See also B. Deen, D. Zandee and A. Stoetman, ‘Uncharted and uncomfortable in European defence: The EU’s mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7)’ (Report), Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, January 2022, p. 19.
[18] See P. Navarro I Serradell, ‘A Comparative Study of Article 5 of the NATO and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on The European Union: Its Scope and Limits’ (Paper), FINABEL, 2024.
[19] Regolamento (UE) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, OJ L 170, 12.05.2021, pp. 149-177.
[20] Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States, OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, pp. 57-77.
[21] NATO, ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, 29 June 2022, p. 1. See also Z. Szenes, ‘Reinforcing deterrence: assessing NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept’, in Defense & Security Analysis, 2023, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 539-560.
[22] See, e.g., A. Roque, ‘Trump announces plan to sell NATO countries weapons for Ukraine’ (Breaking Defense, 14 July 2025).
[23] P. D. Wezeman et al., ‘Trends in international arms transfers, 2023’ (Fact Sheet), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2024, p. 1.
[24]A. Clark, ‘Armed by America: how Europe’s militaries depend on the US – A visual analysis’ (The Guardian, 24 June 2025). See also J. Mejino Lopez and G. B. Wolff, ‘What role do imports play in European defence?’ (Analysis), Bruegel, 4 July 2024.
[25] See European Commission, ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (Communication), COM(2021) 70 final, Brussels, 22.02.2021.
[26] See M. Klamert, ‘Article 3 TEU’, in M. Kellerbauer et al. (eds.), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 31-34. [27] See T. Ramopoulos, ‘Article 21 TEU’, in M. Kellerbauer et al. (eds.), The EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 200-204.
[28] W. Alberque, ‘The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control’ (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 June 2022).
[29] See J. Solanki, ‘Under the Radar: Twenty years of EU military missions’ (Policy briefing), Transnational Institute (TNI), 8 May 2024.
[30] See Y. A. Stivachtis, C. Price and M. Habegger, ‘The European Union as a Peace Actor’, in Review of European Studies, 2013, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 1-17.
[31] See H. M. Heinig, ‘The Political and the Basic Law’s Sozialstaat Principle – Perspectives from Constitutional Law and Theory’, in German Law Journal, 2011, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 1887-1900.
[32] E. Gilmartin, ‘Spain Is Right to Reject Increased Military Spending’ (JACOBIN, 21 June 2025).
[33] N. Grigorakis and G. Galyfianakis, ‘Warfare vs. Welfare Finance: Assessing the Effect of Military Expenditure on Out of Pocket Healthcare Financing for NATO Countries’, in Theoretical Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 219-244.
[34] See J. Boussemart and M. Godet, ‘Europe 2050: Demographic Suicide’ (Policy Paper), Schuman Papers no. 462/2018, Foundation Robert Schuman, 13 February 2018.
[35] See M. Igini, ‘Top 6 Environmental Issues in Europe in 2024’ (Earth-org, 4 November 2022). 
[36] L. Sasse and H. T. Berz, ‘Housing Crisis in the European Union’ (Fact Sheets), European Parliament, April 2025.
[37] V. Goury-Laffont, L. Kayali and S. Paillou, ‘Welfare vs. warfare: France’s political parties divided over cash for defense’ (Politico, 11 March 2025).
[38]A. Brzozowski, ‘Slovenia to call consultative referendum on NATO membership’ (Euractiv, 5 July 2025).
[39] C. Casati (Counter Balance) and L. Sédou (ENAAT), ‘Warfare or welfare: the EU’s choice’ (22 November 2024), <https://counter-balance.org/media/warfare-or-welfare-the-eus-choice>.
[40] See M. Roberts, ‘From welfare to warfare: military Keynesianism’ (CADTM, 24 March 2025).
[41] See, inter alia, R. Erne et al., ‘EU Governance of Public Services and Its Discontents’ in Ids., Politicising Commodification: European Governance and Labour Politics from the Financial Crisis to the Covid Emergency, Cambridge University Press, 2024, pp. 132-164.
[42] See, e.g., S. Bargiacchi, ‘Il controllo parlamentare sulla fornitura di materiale bellico ad un paese terzo: Similitudini e differenze tra Italia e Germania in relazione alla vicenda Ucraina’, in DPCE Online, 2024, vol. 63, no. SP1, pp. 615-638.
[43] On this issue see Y. Varoufakis, ‘How Europe Fell Into the Arms of Warmongering, and What We Must Do’ (Z, 17 June 2025).

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