Balochistan is a battleground between the Pakistani government and separatist groups, but for China, it represents a €60 billion investment. Meanwhile, India, locked in regional rivalry with Beijing, faces accusations from Pakistan of backing these insurgents. How do the geopolitical ambitions of Beijing and New Delhi intersect with the Baloch people’s struggle for self-determination against Islamabad?
The Situation in Balochistan Today
In Balochistan, 2025 began with a new tragedy: on Saturday, January 4, a bus carrying paramilitary troops from the Frontier Corps (FC) exploded in the city of Turbat[1]. The attack, the latest claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), comes just months the Pakistani government announced the launch of a «comprehensive military operation»[2], targeting active Baloch separatist groups within the country. An official statement from the office of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif specified that the operation, supported by the People’s Republic of China, aims to neutralize groups like the BLA, which has been accused of providing logistical support and training facilities to other militant organizations.
There is no doubt that violence by these groups has intensified. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) recorded at least 71 attacks in November alone[3]. The attack on Quetta’s railway station on November 9 was the deadliest since August, when more than 50 people were killed in assaults on government installations, including police stations and security force camps across the province[4]. The BLA has repeatedly claimed that its struggle targets what it calls the occupying Pakistani military. In Quetta, more than a dozen of the approximately one hundred passengers waiting for the train were members of Pakistan’s security forces[5]. Although most attacks are anti-government, an anti-Chinese element is also apparent.
The October 6, 2024, bombing at Islamabad Airport, which killed two Chinese nationals, was claimed by the BLA[6]. This incident highlights how infrastructure projects tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—including Chinese workers and engineers—have become prime targets for Baloch separatists. These groups accuse China of arming Pakistan against them and exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources at the expense of the local population.
It is clear why Beijing has chosen to strengthen its military cooperation with Islamabad[7], deploying troops for joint military exercises and enhancing the security of Chinese nationals in Pakistan. The Warrior VIII exercises[8], launched in late November 2024, focus on protecting Chinese engineers working on key CPEC projects and securing the infrastructure itself.
This scenario raises three critical questions: What are the roots of the conflict between Baloch separatism and the Pakistani government? How does this struggle fit into the marriage of convenience between Pakistan and China? And finally, what are the implications of this dynamic for the geopolitical triangle involving Islamabad, Beijing, and New Delhi?
How the Creation of Pakistan Mirrors the Rise of Baloch Self-Determination
To understand the roots of the current conflict, it is important to look back at the creation of Pakistan and how it mirrors the rise of Baloch self-determination.
As history teaches us, after World War II, Britain, though victorious, struggled to maintain direct control over its empire, making Indian independence inevitable. This posed a dilemma: how could Britain safeguard its strategic interests in the region after withdrawal? On one side loomed the growing threat of the Soviet Union as a rising superpower; on the other was the desire to retain influence over Persian Gulf oil reserves. Thus, the creation of a client state – Pakistan – became the perfect plan to keep the situation under control[9].
Britain seized the opportunity to exploit long-standing—or deliberately stoked—religious divides in India by promoting the idea of partition between Muslims and Hindus. What was presented as a response to local demands was, in reality, a calculated political manoeuvre by the colonial administration. For Britain, Islam was a strategic tool in the “Great Game” against Russia, used to rally Muslim populations first against Orthodox Russia, and later against the atheistic Bolshevik socialists.
The Khanate of Kalat (Baloch state) believed that with the end of British colonial rule in India, its pre-1876 independent status would be restored, reclaiming full sovereignty over its lands. However, the khanate underestimated its vulnerability due to its strategic location near the emerging state of Pakistan. On August 12, 1947, the Baloch state declared independence, with initial assurances from Britain and Pakistan that its sovereignty would be respected. Yet, within less than a year, on April 1, 1948, those promises were broken: Balochistan was forcefully annexed into Pakistan without consent and with no significant resistance[10]. The Baloch leadership was caught unprepared by the rapid developments in international politics: in the process of making Pakistan vital, their land was taken from them, and a long and bloody conflict followed between Balochistan and Pakistan.
Over the years, the relationship between Baloch resistance and the Pakistani state has been marked by systematic military repression and intermittent negotiation attempts. Starting from the new millennium, Pakistani forces have intensified operations in Balochistan, justifying them as necessary measures to safeguard national interests. However, these operations have resulted in violent repression, including airstrikes on militant hideouts, the arrest of thousands of people, and enforced disappearances that often lead to torture and even death.
Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, have condemned these abuses[11]. People are torn from their loved ones by state officials or others acting on their behalf, thus being excluded from the protection of the law. Enforced disappearances are a tool of terror that not only affects individuals and families but also undermines the entire social fabric of communities. This practice, when used as part of widespread or systematic attacks on civilians, constitutes a crime against humanity[12]. It violates fundamental human rights, including recognition before the law, personal liberty and security, protection from torture, the right to life, identity, a fair trial, effective remedies, and the right to know the truth about the circumstances of the disappearance[13].
But What Does China Have to Do With It?
As mentioned earlier, Chinese economic interests in Balochistan—particularly those linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—have often been targeted by separatist groups. But why? Balochistan is a resource-rich region, abundant in hydrocarbons and minerals[14], where the local population feels exploited, reaping no economic benefits from these natural assets[15]. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), channeling this discontent, opposes Sino-Pakistani operations, claiming they exploit the province’s oil, gas, and minerals without delivering any tangible benefits to its people. For Baloch separatists, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and CPEC symbolize tools of resource appropriation that threaten the region’s future.
Indeed, within the BRI and CPEC frameworks, China has invested heavily in infrastructure and mining ventures, including the Saindak gold and copper project involving Chinese consortia[16]. Another critical interest for China is Gwadar Port. In 2001, during the 50th anniversary of Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations, China, with Islamabad’s full support, identified Gwadar as the linchpin of its geoeconomic strategy, initiating its construction shortly thereafter[17].
Traditionally, China had relied on the Strait of Malacca for about 50% of its crude oil imports[18]—a vital but highly vulnerable maritime route considered a strategic chokepoint, exposed to geopolitical blockades, military tensions, and piracy threats. Gwadar, with its direct links to western China via a network of roads, railways, and pipelines, reduces transport times and logistics costs while securing strategic access to the Persian Gulf. This access strengthens China’s regional influence and cements its role as a key player in global energy dynamics.
But when did the relationship between Islamabad and Beijing begin? The roots of Sino-Pakistani ties date back to the early years after both nations gained independence. Emerging as an insecure state surrounded by hostile threats, Pakistan sought strategic alliances to balance its larger neighbour, India. Initially aligned with the United States[19], Islamabad later turned to China as a natural ally— “the enemy of my enemy.” Pakistan was proactive in cultivating this relationship, becoming in 1950 the third non-communist, second Commonwealth, and first Muslim-majority country to officially recognize the People’s Republic of China. Islamabad further solidified the partnership by supporting Beijing in international forums, notably abstaining from resolutions labelling China an aggressor during the Korean War[20].
A turning point in the relationship came during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when China clashed with India over control of Aksai Chin, a region of Kashmir. Islamabad seized the opportunity to strengthen its ties with Beijing: in 1963, the two countries signed a border agreement, with Pakistan ceding part of the disputed Kashmir to China[21]. This symbolic yet strategic act paved the way for broader cooperation, culminating in projects like the 1970s construction of the Karakoram Highway, which linked western China to Pakistan through the Himalayas[22]. This highway not only strengthened economic ties but also laid the foundation for China’s infrastructural expansion in the region.
The success of the Karakoram Highway showcased the potential of Sino-Pakistani collaboration in overcoming geographic and logistical challenges. It encouraged Pakistan to pursue further Chinese investments, eventually leading to the 2015 launch of the CPEC. This multibillion-dollar megaproject[23], an extension of the Karakoram vision, has become a global transport and economic corridor central to both countries’ strategic ambitions.
Conclusions
The Baloch separatist struggle against the Pakistani government intertwines with the economic and strategic interests of the Islamabad-Beijing-New Delhi triangle. While this analysis does not delve deeply into the issue, it is impossible to study Pakistan’s relationship with China without considering their shared adversary: India. As previously mentioned, one of the primary motivations behind Pakistan-China cooperation is the existence of this common rival.
China’s growing presence in Pakistan has raised alarm in New Delhi. The expanding Chinese infrastructure footprint, along with its significant military involvement in Pakistani territory, is perceived as a potential strategic threat, particularly due to concerns that these developments could facilitate troop movements toward the Indian border. That’s why Pakistan thinks that India is backing Baloch separatists, exploiting their cause to counter China’s rising influence in the region.
The rapid economic rise of India is becoming an increasing concern for the Beijing-Islamabad alliance. For two decades, China has driven global growth with impressive figures, but now its momentum has slowed. In 2022, China’s growth was just over 3%, half of the previous year’s rate and far below the set target. Meanwhile, India is seeing robust growth: 8.7% in 2021, around 7% in 2022, and a target of over 6% for 2023[24].
So, China’s vested interest in securing its operations in Pakistan is now clear; the success of the CPEC is vital to the country’s economic stability, Beijing’s regional credibility, and the strength of its partnership with Islamabad. In this context, enhanced military cooperation between China and Pakistan—including troop deployments and joint military exercises—signals Beijing’s readiness to support Pakistan’s government. This support aims to ensure the stability of its Pakistani ally and safeguard China’s strategic investments in the province, confirming an approach focused on cooperation and protection of its economic and infrastructural initiatives. Nevertheless, this only exacerbates the pressures on the Baloch people, pushing their struggle for self-determination into an increasingly complex conflict involving not just the Pakistani government, but also foreign powers.
At the heart of this geopolitical contest lies a violence-ridden region, where thousands of lives are lost in clashes between the Pakistani state and separatist groups fighting for freedom from Islamabad’s control. Zahid Baloch, chairman of the Baloch Student Organization-Azad (BSOA), symbolizes the repression faced by Baloch separatists[25]. Kidnapped in Quetta on March 18, 2014, his family still does not know his fate. Witnesses claim he was taken at gunpoint. The BSOA, which advocates for Balochistan’s secession from Pakistan, was banned in 2013, accused of “involvement in terrorism,” though Zahid had insisted in a BBC interview six months before his disappearance that his organization was committed to a non-violent struggle for self-determination.
So, what is happening in Balochistan? While 70% of the population lacks access to gas, 78% lives without electricity, and 62% without drinking water[26] —making it the region with the highest infant and maternal mortality rates and some of the worst malnutrition levels in Asia—crimes against humanity are taking place far from the spotlight of Western media[27].
Note
[1] Pak Under Attack: Military Bus Bombed, Over 60 Killed, Injured In Balochistan,” YouTube, posted by Times of India, 5 January 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZ2GSsZyWBk
[2] M. AHMED, «Pakistan PM approves military operation against separatists following surge in violence in southwest», The Independent, 19 November 2024.
[3] A. HUSSAIN, «Pakistan ramps up military operations amid surge in violent attacks», Al Jazeera, 2 December 2024.
[4] M. AHMED, op. cit., note 1.
[5] D. BELLAMY, «Pakistan, attacco suicida dei separatisti nel Belucistan: almeno 24 morti e 50 feriti», EuroNews, 9 November 2024.
[6] C. DAVIS, «Blast kills two Chinese near Pakistan’s Karachi airport», BBC, 7 October 2024
[7] C. ZHUO, «Chinese troops arrive in Pakistan for Warrior-VIII», China’s Ministry of National Defense website, 20 November 2024
[8] Ibidem
[9] N. DASHTI, The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan: Aspects of a National Liberation Struggle, Black Lacquer Press, Las Vegas 2017, p. 110
[10] N. DASHTI, op. cit., note 7, p. 116
[11] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, «Pakistan: The disappeared of Balochistan», Public Statement, 12 November 2020
[12] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7. Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int
[13] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, op. cit, note 9
[14] U. BOUNAT, «Entre Iran et Pakistan, une région à risque : le Balouchistan», Asia Focus, n. 57, 11 January 2018, p. 4
[15] T. BRAMBILLA, «Pakistan e Cina: alleati contro il terrorismo in Belucistan», Inside Over, 23 November 2024
[16] S. FAZL-E-HAIDER, «A Chinese-run gold mine in Balochistan is making millions, but the locals aren’t getting any of it», The China Project, 5 January 2023
[17] A. SHUKLA, «Pakistan-China Relations: A Case Study of All-Weather Friendship», Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, vol. 17, n. 3-4, 2013, p. 222
[18] The editorial team, «Factbox – Malacca Strait is a strategic “chokepoint”», Reuters, 4 March 2010
[19] N. DASHTI, op. cit., note 7, p. 182
[20] I. GUL, «Changing face of China-Pakistan ties», Al Jazeera, 9 October 2003
[21] A. SHUKLA, op. cit., note 11, p. 217
[22] A. SHUKLA, op. cit., note 11, pp. 219-220
[23] World Bank, «CPEC offers enormous potential to boost Pakistan economy, report says», Press Release, 22 March 2018
[24] P. HASKI, «C’è qualcosa di nuovo nella rivalità tra Cina e India», L’Internazionale, 18 January 2023
[25] AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, op. cit, note 9
[26] U. BOUNAT, op. cit., note 12, p. 5
[27] See paragraph 2
Foto copertina: Balochistan
