Where some critical issues risk to weakness the effort of the EU to build a proper own defence capacity.
Strengthening European security is an urgent need, in the “new” world of wars and instability we are living in. The awakening caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine had only been reinforced by the abandon of multilateralism and the possible (at least partial) withdrawal of the United States governed by Trump from European defence.
That perspective, the commitment of European NATO members to reach 5% of GDP in defence spending can be seen as a step forward. As well as the willingness of the European Union to invest 800 billion euros in the coming four years, according to the plan of the European Commission.
More commitment within NATO and, at the same time, more autonomy from NATO. That sounds a good strategy, indeed.
Yet… things are not as simple, actually.
Europeans have submitted to the Amerikan diktat to improve their defence spending up to 5% of their GDP[1], but there are some significant issues. The 5% refers to the sum of 3,5% of effective military spending plus a 1,5% in infrastructure and related spending. This leaves the door open to doubts, or at least lack of clarity, on what amount will be effectively invested in defence and security. Moreover, there is no guarantee on the achievement of concrete objectives in terms of coherence of strategic vision and uniformity of approach: the national approach remains the normal pattern, with consequent divergence between various countries (risking to increase the already existing heterogeneity), the lack of a real common organisation and coordination is untouched by the commitment to increase the national spending and, last but not least, the dependence on United States is increased rather than decreased, as most of the supplies will be purchased from US, either due to lack of alternatives or because of the more or less explicit imposition by the American ally.
As for the 800 billion to be spent by the member States of the European Union, according to the Commission’s plans ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030[2], these are investments partially overlapping with the NATO expenses. They will be financed by common EU debt only to a minimal extent and for the big bunch they will be charged to national budgets, what, among other things, entails a weakening of the Stability Pact’s rules. A green light for Member States to more deficit spending, but only on defence, leaving all other expenses under the constraint of the rules.
Let’s see in more details the split between common and national investments.
The Security Action for Europe fund (SAFE)[3] will raise up to 150 billion of euros on the market, guaranteed by the EU. That money will be allocated to the interested states as low-interest and long-term loans, the repayments of which are expected to begin in the forthcoming tenth years and last for a full forty-five years. To access the fund, states are requested to make joint purchases (with at least one other EU state) of certain weapons/defence systems which should be manufactured in Europe (65% of the production, minimum). For that part, SAFE is supposed to stimulate the European defence industry and contribute to establish a minimum level of coordination and rationalisation.
The estimation of the remaining 600 billion of euros is based on the option by member states to finance defence spending exceeding the limits of the Stability Pact by 1,5%. So, national governments will be authorised to raise their 3% general debt ceiling up to 4,5% for rearmament.
All in all, notwithstanding the positive aspects (a first step, given the condition), the main critical issues are: a persistent dependence on US industry that will not be reduced in short times, the preponderance of national borrowing to the detriment of any “federal” strengthening in defence policies and capabilities, the political risk linked with possible cuts under other sensible budget chapters (both at EU and national level), like welfare, employment, territorial and social cohesion, industrial development other than in defence and security.
Notes
[1] NATO Summit, The Hague, 24-25 June 2025.
[2] European Commission, White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, October 2025.
[3] Council of the EU, Brussels, 27 May 2025.
